House of Generals: Why Washington Still Falls for Strongmen in Uniform

When General Asim Munir entered the White House on June 18, 2025, for a private luncheon with Donald Trump, it reaffirmed a familiar pattern: Washington was once again dealing not with Pakistan’s elected leadership but with the man in uniform who holds real power in Islamabad.

The meeting—framed as a gesture of gratitude for Munir’s role in defusing India-Pakistan tensions—came amid escalating U.S.-Iran frictions. To some, it looked like a diplomatic breakthrough. To others, it echoed a well-worn script: Pakistan’s military leveraging global crises to secure Western support—often while quietly pursuing its own agenda.

Military First: A Relationship Forged in Uniform 

Since the 1950s, Pakistan’s generals—not its civilian leaders—have shaped the country’s most consequential foreign policy, particularly with the United States.

General Ayub Khan laid the foundation by aligning with Eisenhower and Kennedy during the Cold War in exchange for military and economic aid. General Zia-ul-Haq deepened this model during the Soviet-Afghan War, partnering with the CIA to support the mujahideen and receiving billions in U.S. assistance.

After 9/11, General Pervez Musharraf aligned with President George W. Bush, securing Major Non-NATO Ally status and more than $10 billion in aid.

Now, General Munir’s 2025 meeting with Trump signals a revival of this military-first engagement—one that continues to favor Rawalpindi over Islamabad.

Tactical Timing, Familiar Playbook

Munir’s visit came at a critical moment. With tensions rising in the Middle East, Pakistan positioned itself as a potential mediator between Washington and Tehran. Trump praised Pakistan’s “deep understanding” of Iran, hinting at behind-the-scenes cooperation—whether intelligence sharing, diplomatic backchanneling, or logistical access—in exchange for financial or military concessions.

At first glance, the meeting suggested renewed strategic alignment. But beneath the optics lies a familiar dynamic: Pakistan’s military offering short-term utility while quietly advancing its own long-term regional interests.

A Double Game in Plain Sight

While Pakistan publicly presents itself as a loyal U.S. ally, its actions often suggest otherwise. The post-9/11 era laid bare this contradiction, as Pakistan aided the U.S. war on terror while simultaneously harboring or enabling the very militants Washington sought to eliminate.

1. Sheltering High-Value Targets

In 2011, U.S. Navy SEALs found Osama bin Laden hiding in Abbottabad—next to Pakistan’s military academy. Washington kept Islamabad in the dark, fearing a leak. The physician who assisted the CIA, Dr. Shakil Afridi, remains imprisoned in Pakistan—a lasting symbol of the country's divided loyalties.

2. Backing Anti-U.S. Proxies

Even as American aid flowed in, Pakistan’s security agencies supported groups like the Haqqani Network and Afghan Taliban. These so-called “strategic assets” attacked NATO forces while advancing Pakistan’s influence in post-war Afghanistan.

3. Misusing U.S. Military Aid

In 2019, Pakistan deployed U.S.-supplied F-16s during the Balakot standoff with India, violating the aircrafts’ counterterrorism-specific usage terms. The incident heightened U.S. concerns about Pakistan’s trustworthiness as a defense partner.

4. Rent-Seeking as Grand Strategy

As scholar C. Christine Fair has noted, Pakistan’s military has perfected the art of “strategic rent-seeking”—offering selective cooperation to extract aid while pursuing independent regional agendas. This pattern dates back to the 1970s, when Islamabad cultivated jihadist networks even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Strategic Gains, Democratic Losses 

Munir’s visit has set off a fresh round of geopolitical recalibrations. Pakistan stands to gain short-term economic relief, potentially unlocking IMF engagement and bilateral aid. It has also regained regional visibility by positioning itself as a mediator in the Iran-Israel conflict. Domestically, the White House optics have strengthened Munir’s image amid rising anti-military sentiment, reinforcing the army’s dominance over Pakistan’s political narrative.

But these tactical gains come at a high cost. Civilian leadership remains sidelined, deepening Pakistan’s democratic erosion. Reports suggest Washington may extend new military assistance—a prospect that has raised alarm in New Delhi, especially in the wake of Operation Sindoor, India’s retaliatory strikes on Pakistani military infrastructure following the Pahalgam terror attack.

Trump’s earlier claim of brokering a ceasefire between India and Pakistan has since been walked back. Indian officials clarified that the de-escalation stemmed from direct military-to-military communication—not U.S. mediation.

This evolving alignment risks straining U.S.-India relations, particularly within the QUAD framework, where mutual strategic trust is essential. As Pakistan secures short-term diplomatic wins, it once again delays structural reform and deepens its dependency on crisis-driven diplomacy.

America’s Complicity in the Military-First Model

The United States hasn’t just tolerated this pattern—it has reinforced it. For decades, Washington prioritized expediency over democratic development, engaging Pakistan’s military while sidelining its civilian leadership.

From Zia to Musharraf to Munir, U.S. administrations have legitimized unelected regimes and contributed to the military’s deep entrenchment in policymaking. Today, Pakistan’s parliament exercises little control over foreign affairs. The generals don’t just shape policy—they execute it.

When Pakistan’s Generals Set the Agenda in Washington

A Uniform Diplomacy That Won’t Fade

General Munir’s White House visit may appear to be diplomatic progress, but it underscores an enduring reality: Pakistan’s foreign policy remains the domain of its military, not its parliament. Each new crisis offers fresh leverage. Each photo-op in Washington reinforces the army’s grip back home.

The deeper questions remain: Can Pakistan break out of this cycle? Will the U.S. stop enabling it?

So far, history suggests otherwise. The generals may change. The strategy does not.